after-care. But it was to be another two decades before Friern's closure was formally announced, and a decade more before the hospital shut its doors for the last time.
3 By then, most of the old asylums had closed and the number of psychiatric beds in England had fallen from its 1954 high of 152,000 to 43,000, a drop of 72 per cent.
4 Today these great 'museums of the mad', 5 once such a familiar sight on the outskirts of cities and towns across the UK, have either vanished or metamorphosed into business parks, leisure centres or -as in the case of Friern -up-market housing developments.
6 Their former residents are back with their families, or living in group homes or social housing; or they have vanished into the netherworld of the urban homeless.
Why did the asylums die, and what died with them? The question is controversial. From the 1960s, when Michel Foucault's jeremiad against the 'Great Confinement' of European lunatics lent intellectual muscle to the anti-psychiatry movement, historians of the Asylum Age have divided between critics who regard the asylums as primarily instruments of social control and defenders who stress the humanitarian motives of the asylum founders while acknowledging -insufficiently, critics contend -the abuses and suffering that went on in them.
7 Their demise has also been contentious, with some historians portraying 'deinstitutionalisation' as a progressive policy response to the failings of hospital care, facilitated by the development of new drug therapies, 8 As studies from Britain and elsewhere show, the introduction of new drug therapies did not cause deinstitutionalisation, which was already well underway before the new medications came into use, but it fuelled optimism and played an important role in shaping 'the attractiveness of community care to policy-makers concerned about ever-rising costs of health care within a capitalist welfare system'. 9 The arguments are fiercer for having been strongly politicised, as historians find themselves caught up in the policy battles raging around welfare provision over the last half century.
I do not intend to adjudicate these disagreements (although I have more to say about them further on). I am not a historian of mental health policy and anyway my own concerns are rather different. I am interested neither in loading more opprobrium on the defunct hospitals, nor in defending them (although my experience revealed some things that warrant defending); rather, I want to explore the ideals behind the asylum, and what has become of them in recent times. The birth of the asylum witnessed the emergence of a paradigm conflict still evident in mental health circles. This conflict maps loosely onto the historic opposition between psychological and biomedical models of madness, but terms such as near versus far, interactive versus passive, subject versus object, probably tell us more about it. How close to madness does one need to get to treat it effectively? One paradigm shows us madness practitioners proffering remedies to madness sufferers across a gulf of professional expertise and objectivity; the other shows sufferer and healer drawn together in a therapeutic partnership which, in the strongest versions of this tradition, directly implicates the healer's own psyche in the treatment process (an approach recently described by the leading forensic psychotherapist, Dr Gwen Adshead, as 'mak[ing] your mind available to somebody else, to help them recover').
10 The pioneers of the Asylum Age initiated the second tradition, creating an up-close therapeutic regimen based on personal rapport, moral example and the utilisation of otherregarding emotions ('social affections' in the vocabulary of the day) as remedial agents. This psycho-relational paradigm was known as 'moral treatment', and was strongly resisted by many mad-doctors at the time, accustomed to dispensing biophysical remedies -blood-letting, purging, drugs, psychosurgery, etc. -from a professional distance.
11 The demise of the asylum, I argue below, has reconfigured this conflict without diminishing it, and it continues to reverberate throughout mental health services.
Here in the UK, asylumdom entered its terminal phase with the foundation of the National Health Service. The decision to incorporate mental health services into the NHS, thereby drawing them into the medical mainstream, effectively signed the execution warrant for the old 'bins'.
12 But socialised medicine was not the sole or even the main factor behind deinstitutionalisation. The transfer of mental health care from asylum to community was a general western phenomenon, occurring more or less simultaneously in countries with medical systems as diverse as those of Britain, Italy and the USA. From the 1960s onward, asylums across Europe and North America faced a host of enemies: antipsychiatrists who damned them as 'total institutions' and 'carceral cities'; public purseholders keen to reduce health costs; welfare reformers and campaigning journalists shocked by conditions in the infamous 'back wards'; and, increasingly, patients themselves, organised into a growing 'consumer' movement.
13 The most radical of these opponents (in the UK, R. D. Laing and his followers) regarded themselves as psychiatric insurgents, but the times favoured them.
14 Asylum populations were changing: voluntary patients had been admitted since 1930, and in the wake of the 1959 Mental Health Act (which abolished the distinction between psychiatric and general hospitals) the ratio of voluntary to detained patients rose dramatically: a transformation that made the custodial regimen of the old asylums appear gratuitously oppressive as well as out-dated.
15 Outpatient psychiatric services had expanded throughout the 1950s and 1960s, as new drug treatments made it possible to treat increasing numbers of people in their homes. By the early 1970s, asylums everywhere were recording a steady shrinkage in their resident numbers.
16 Moreover, many of the buildings housing these old 15 Bennett, 'Drive towards Community', 327. 16 Admission rates (including repeated admissions: the notorious 'revolving-door' syndrome) were higher than ever by the end of the 1960s, but these admissions were increasingly short term (see n. 1 for references). hospitals were crumbling. Refurbishing them would be hugely costly: an unwelcome prospect to governments, especially during the fiscal crisis of the seventies. And then there were the scandals. In the UK, there were a series of these in the 1960s and 1970s -several involving Friern hospitalwhich gave the coup de grâce to the Asylum Age. Who could defend institutions that handled people like 'human trash'? as one journalist demanded in the wake of a major exposé of the treatment of the demented elderly at Friern in the late 1960s.
17
This constellation of anti-asylum forces could be found, with variations, in most western nations. But deinstitutionalisation also had a deeper root, in resurgent free-market ideology and the correlative attack on welfare 'dependency'. The last quarter of the twentieth century saw the post-war welfare settlement coming under sustained assault from free-marketeers, with a commensurate growth in hostility toward people reliant on state support. The opprobrium was initially directed against those traditional bogeys of the liberal (now 'neoliberal') imagination -the idle, the shiftless, the 'undeserving poor' -but quickly expanded to include new categories such as single mothers and, inevitably, the chronically mad:
The punitive sentiments directed against those who must feed from the public trough extend only too easily to embrace those who suffer from the most severe forms of psychiatric misery . . . those incapacitated by psychiatric disability all too often find themselves the targets of those who would abolish social programs because they consider any social dependency immoral. 18 Today the discourse of mental health 'providers' is all about autonomy and independence. The language of dependency is almost entirely negative. Its primary referents are to drug and alcohol addiction, but the pejorative connotations extend across most varieties of neediness, including for basic care and support. To need other people on a day-today basis (unless you are very young, very old or very disabled) is seen as inherently pathological; independence is a sina qua non of mental health.
19
The motives behind this philosophy are, in many respects, honourable: to treat mentally ill people as full adults, capable of making valid life decisions; to prevent emotional exploitation; to promote self-confidence and reduce stigmatisation. But the ideal of personal autonomy driving the agenda is, Elizabeth Bott has argued in a classic study of hospital care, 21 (The following year the government introduced Community Treatment Orders, which compel previously detained patients to take their medication under threat of re-hospitalisation if they refuse.) This 'logic of choice' is the focus of a recent book by the Dutch philosopher Annemarie Mol, who contrasts it to a 'logic of care'. 'Choice', Mol shows, interpellates the patient as an autonomous consumer selecting from an array of treatment options, while the 'logic of care' sees patient and carer interacting for the patient's benefit. Mol illustrates the difference between the two logics with an anecdote about a man in a mental hospital who refuses to leave his bed. A group of ethicists and psychiatrists meet to discuss how the man should be treated. The ethicists argue for non-intervention: the patient, they say, is harming no one by staying in bed; it's his choice to be there; he should be left alone. A discussion of what choice means for someone with severe mental illness ensues; eventually a psychotherapist cuts across it. The question, he says, cannot be decided outside its institutional context. Does the hospital have plenty of staff? If so, a nurse should be assigned to sit by the patient's bed and find out why he doesn't want to get up. ' Maybe his wife is not coming for a visit that afternoon, maybe he feels awful and fears he will never be released from hospital. Take time for him, let him talk.' Someone who does not want to get up, says the psychotherapist, needs care. Offering him the choice of staying in bed is as much a way of neglecting him as is forcing him to get up. 'Choice' in mental health care is usually contrasted to force: 'is care a soft form of force', Mol asks, 'or might it be something different?' 23 The view of psychiatric care as a 'soft form of force' was popular in libertarian circles in the 1960s and 1970s, and still has many proponents. But what was once an anti-Establishment stance has now leached into official policy. Alongside choice, mental health policy-makers today are increasingly preoccupied by risk: a concern that focuses primarily on safety risks to the public from aggressive patients, 24 but which runs too in the opposite direction: toward the potential risks to patient autonomy from carers and care institutions. Minimising these latter risks is a core aim of the 'recovery model', a healthcare approach which means living with a chronic illness as if one doesn't have it.
25 Services everywhere are becoming geared to this model, which requires patients (service users as they are now known) to pass through the system as quickly as possible; open-ended care -whether on an outpatient or inpatient basis -is a no-no.
26 Even 23 Ibid., xii.
24 Risk leapt to the forefront of UK government mental health policy after the widely publicised murder of Jonathan Zito by the schizophrenic Christopher Clunis in 1992. The public inquiry that followed revealed care failures that were deemed to necessitate a more risk-oriented policy approach. 'Risk minimisation' became the must-do, dominating day-today decision-making, albeit in ways that sat very uneasily alongside the 'choice' agenda. As John Wilkinson, a former manager of mental health services in East London, writes: 'The very people who stalk the nightmares of tabloid editors and Heath Ministers and who must be policed in thought and act, at one and the same time are Consumers, who must exercise Choice and must assess the Performance of those providing them with services. The very people who must be subject to community orders and who must demonstrate Compliance -with treatment, with care plans -must grasp those opportunities made available to them through the new Recovery perspective!' (John Wilkinson, 'The Politics of Risk and Trust in Mental Health', Critical Quarterly, 46, 3 (2004), 83). 25 The recovery model is a complex policy initiative. It has received strong impetus from the service-users movement, which sees in it a rejection of psychiatric paternalism in favour of a service that treats its users as persons rather than patients, and affords them a greater voice over their treatments and care. Critics however -which includes both users and practitioners -argue that the model has been 'hijacked' by mental health managers as a way of legitimating service cuts. NHS psychological treatments like cognitive behaviour therapy are timelimited in order to encourage 'client self-management' and to mitigate 'dependency issues'.
27 The ideal of the autonomous self underpinning these policies is so radically individuated that it begins to approximate to Melanie Klein's account of psychotic aloneness, although in this case the anxieties driving the fantasy belong to the professionals rather than the mad.
28 It is as if the terrible loneliness of madness, which Klein describes so well, has flooded the entire mental health establishment. Cognitive behaviour therapy, for example, can now be done on the NHS without any human contact at all, sitting alone at one's computer with an online CBT package -and this despite the fact that a host of studies have shown that it is the quality of the relationship with the therapist that determines the outcome of CBT, as it does all therapeutic encounters.
29
I interviewed a number of mental health managers for this lecture. All, with one exception, repeated the anti-dependency mantra; all, without exception, spoke passionately about the need for emotional rapport between care-workers and users, and -in the spirit of Mol's psychotherapist -gave examples of up-close, sympathetic care relationships as instances of best practice. These contradictions, a London psychiatrist explained to me, are not incidental but endemic to a system . Today this is a failing which many service managerskeen to avoid 'dependency-generative relationships' -seem to regard as a strength, while mental health staff who continue to emphasise the value of the therapeutic relationship are 'dismissed as self-serving and mystifying' (Wilkinson, 'Politics of Risk', 95).
that requires mental health professionals to respond empathically to patient suffering while simultaneously defending themselves against this suffering lest it draw them into care relationships that violate the antidependency imperative. These emotional defences are also meant to keep the craziness on the patient's side, well away from professional sanity . . . although this isn't always so easy. Mental health workers must get close enough to their clients' misery to comprehend it; keeping too far away, as one service manager complained to me, makes them callous. 'So how do you stay sane?' I asked a long-time psychiatrist. 'I don't always', he told me. 'I don't think I should. ' These paradoxes are stark today, but they are not new: the underlying issues stretch back to the beginnings of the asylum age. 'I used to be astonished', the leading Victorian psychiatrist John Conolly wrote in 1856, 'to see humane physicians going daily round the wards of asylums, mere spectators of every form of distressing coercion, without a word of sympathy, or any order for its mitigation.'
30 But now, Conolly claimed, things were changing. In the 1840s, Conolly had been the superintendent of Hanwell Asylum in Middlesex, an institution whose medical officer was 'really intimate with the insane'. 'He is constantly with the patients', Conolly wrote of this practitioner: 'their characters are intimately known to him; he watches the effects of all the means of cure to which he resorts; and his own character gives the tone to the whole house'.
31 As a result, 'wherever they [inmates] go they meet kind people and hear kind words; they are never passed without some recognition, and the face of every officer is the face of a friend'.
32
The sympathetic relationships described by Conolly were the linchpin of moral treatment, the foundational regimen of the public asylum system. Moral treatment, which was pioneered at the end of the eighteenth century by Phillipe Pinel in France and the Tuke family in England, was a portmanteau term for therapeutics directed at the minds and emotions of lunatics (their 'moral' characteristics) rather than any supposed organic cause of insanity.
33 At a minimum, moral treatment meant managing lunatics without recourse to 'mechanical restraints' such as chains or manacles, or to the ineffectual and often brutal physical remedies favoured by mad-doctors of the period. In its stronger versions, it was a psycho-therapeutic that utilised the asylum environment and staff/inmate relationships as healing agents. Phillipe Pinel was physician-in-chief at the Salpêtrière asylum from 1795. There he engaged his patients in 'repeated, probing, personal conversations', taking detailed notes as they spoke.
34 Pathological ideas and emotions (the 'secrets of the heart') were identified and, where possible, gently challenged.
35 Pinel and the Tukes were passionate believers in the efficacy of douceur, 'judicious kindness' in Samuel Tuke's phrase, 36 and their curative optimism was very strong. Prior to the eighteenth century, lunacy had been anathematised as a debased, reprobate or even bestial state. Enlightened opinion in the eighteenth century reconceived it as an ailment to which any personeven a king, as in the case of George III -might succumb. Now moral therapists insisted that the disease was only partial, that lunatics retained intellectual and moral powers which, if properly acted upon in a supportive environment, would replace 'morbid feelings . . . [with] healthy trains of thought'.
37 Ordinary life, especially family life, was full of travails and 'excitements' that wracked the fragile mind.
38 A well-conducted asylum was a sanctum where demented minds could be soothed into sanity:
calmness will come; hope will revive; satisfaction will prevail. Some unmanageable tempers, some violent or sullen patients, there must always be; but much of the violence, much of the ill-humour, almost all the disposition to meditate mischievous or fatal revenge, or self-destruction will disappear . . . .and despair itself will sometimes be found to give place to cheerfulness or secure tranquility. [ 38 Arguing for the institutional confinement of the insane, some early champions of the asylum system claimed that removal from family life was, for many lunatics, a prerequisite to recovery (Scull, 'Historical Reflections', 3). Historians have tended to dismiss such arguments as self-serving, but it seems very likely, as Elizabeth Bott suggests, that for some inmates the asylum served as a refuge from miserable homes. Bott tells the story of one female patient who, during a period of turmoil in her hospital, remarked to Bott: 'There are so many changes and upsets here now that I might as well go home' ('Hospital and Society', 128). 39 Conolly, quoted in Scull, 'Historical Reflections', 4.
encouraged to participate in the religious life of the community.
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Whipping and manacling were banned, although milder forms of restraint were permitted as a last resort. Bleeding, purging, drugging and other popular medical treatments were mostly eschewed in favour of rational conversation (to wean patients away from mad ideas) and appeals to the patient's moral sensibility. Like Pinel, the Tukes were agnostic about whether madness had a biophysical component but, as William Tuke testified to the 1815 Select Committee on lunacy, experience had demonstrated that treatments directed at the body had 'very little effect' in 'cases of mental derangement'.
41
Mad-doctors, pushed onto the back foot, were generally hostile. 42 But lay reformers and legislators were more persuadable, and by the midnineteenth century a dilute version of moral treatment, combining nonrestraint with some traditional medical remedies, had become public policy. 43 In 1845, the government made it mandatory for local authorities across England and Wales to provide institutional care for pauper lunatics, then mostly languishing in workhouses. A Lunacy Commission was created to regulate all institutions catering to the insane. In 1847, the commissioners reported very favourably on the 'substitution of mild and gentle treatment in place of the old method of mechanical coercion', and by 1854, twenty-seven of the thirty county asylums in England and Wales had abandoned mechanical restraints.
44 Visitors to the Hanwell Asylum, where Conolly had pioneered non-restraint in the 1840s, were delighted to witness the inmates gardening, attending chapel and even dancing at a Christmas party without 'a single circumstance occurring to mar [their] happiness'.
45
These happy times did not last long, as we shall see. But how happy were they? Like other aspects of asylum history, the moral treatment tradition has been contentious. Critics have raised questions about the continued use of physical restraints, the quality of nursing staff, the uneasy balance between care and custodialism.
46 The psycho-relational method pioneered in the moral-treatment asylums has also come in for criticismmost famously from Michel Foucault, who in an excoriating attack on the 40 Digby, Madness, 37-50. 41 up-close therapeutics practised by Pinel and the Tukes, charged them with fostering a malign complicity between the madman and the practitioner who 'begin to form a strange sort of couple, an undivided unity . . . the root cell of madness'.
47 This therapeutic coupling, Foucault went on to argue, paved the way to Freudian psychoanalysis, in which 'all the structures integrated by Pinel and Tuke into confinement' became 'concentrated' in the analytic relationship. 'All the powers that had been shared out in the collective existence of the asylum' were 'appropriated' by the analyst, Foucault fulminated, in a 'gigantic moral imprisonment'. Freud thereby 'freed the patient from . . . asylum existence' only to bring the spirit of the asylum into the 'psychoanalytic situation': a paradox that Foucault clearly relished even as he decried it. 48 In fact, the differences between moral treatment and psychoanalysis were manifold, but Foucault was right to draw a connection.
49 I want now to look at this in more detail. Foucault's critique of moral treatment, in the penultimate chapter of the History of Madness, took him far beyond asylum history, or even madness history as it is generally conceived, into a set of profound meditations on the vicissitudes of human subjectivity. The chapter brought to a head all the paradoxes and inversions that made this extraordinary book such a treasure trove for contrarians. In an anticipation of what he would later describe as subjectification, Foucault denounced Pinellian douceur as psychological authoritarianism. But the authority that moral therapists imposed on the lunatic, Foucault argued, was not external but internal; it was the lunatic's own psyche 'in thrall to the pedagogy of good sense, truth and morality'.
50 What moral treatment inflicted on the madman, via his relationship with his would-be healer (which, in the case of moral-treatment asylums, was more often a lay attendant than a medical physician), was a new agony of self-awareness about his mental state and its impact on others. For William Tuke, Foucault wrote the liberation of the alienated, the abolition of constraints . . . were mere justifications . . . In fact, Tuke created an asylum where he substituted the stifling anguish of responsibility for the free terror of madness; the fear was no longer of what lay on the other side of the prison door, but what raged instead beneath the seals of conscience. 51 47 Foucault, History of Madness, 507. 48 Ibid., 510-11. 49 For a brief discussion of these differences in relation to therapeutic practices at the York Retreat, see Roy Porter, Mind-Forg'd Manacles: A History of Madness in England from the Restoration to the Regency (1987), 225-6. As Porter says, the Tukes were not concerned with exploring the unconscious minds of their patients but in 'making them want to be good'. However, like most historians of moral treatment Porter underestimated the innovativeness of the Tukes' emphasis on the therapeutic relationship as a curative agent. 50 Foucault, History of Madness, 483. 51 Ibid., 484-5.
Here Foucault arraigned Tuke's Quaker convictions, but the argument was not about religious guilt but about self-judgement in general, the 'mind-forg'd manacles' of conscience. Within the lunatic/attendant couple, where the madman's subjectivity became lodged, shackles gave way to self-restraint, surveillance and coercion to self-policing. The inmates of the York Retreat were continuously observed and monitored, but under Tuke's moral ministrations this external gaze became an inward gaze, until these lunatics could not 'fail to see themselves for what they were'.
52
There is much more to Foucault's critique of moral treatment than this, a good deal of which is historically inaccurate.
53 But his emphasis on the therapeutic relationship as the locus of what Andrew Scull calls the 'curative utopianism' of moral treatment is surely right, although Foucault missed the intellectual roots of this optimism. Pinel and Tuke's faith in the healing power of the patient/practitioner interaction was an Enlightenment product, an offshoot of enlightened moral sentimentalism. Moral sentimentalists -who included such luminaries as David Hume, Adam Smith and Jean-Jacques Rousseau -posited a natural sympathy between human beings, an innate fellow-feeling variously dubbed 'sensibility', 'benevolence', or 'social affection'.
54 Pinel and Tuke, and Conolly after them, believed that even the most demented mind retained 'unextinguished remains' of such 'valuable feelings', 55 which they sought to reignite through a combination of moral example and the exercise of their own sympathetic capabilities.
56 Pinel revered Rousseau and was an enthusiastic reader of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, a bible of enlightened sentimentalism.
57 The Tukes were devout believers in the healing powers of Christian love, combining this with Pinellian douceur and enlightened sentimentalism to produce a model of individualised care delivered in an atmosphere of quasi-familial intimacy.
58 Their success rate was said to be high, demonstrating, Samuel Tuke claimed, 'the almost infinite power of judicious kindness and sympathy on disordered minds'.
59
This power could be coercive. Some madmen evinced no social feeling, Pinel conceded, and in such cases 'it is necessary to subjugate first, 52 Ibid., 499. 53 60 Like previous generations of mad-doctors, Pinel was proud of his ability to gain emotional sway over his patients, while insisting that such domination must be 'exempt from feelings of animosity or anger'. 61 The Tukes similarly aimed to 'domineer for good purposes', using techniques of punishment and reward adapted from Quaker childrearing practices (although Samuel Tuke also warned against treating lunatics 'in a childish manner').
62 So Foucault's diatribe against moral treatment contains a kernel of truth, encased in a Dionysian fantasy of madness as untamed libido and psychotherapy as inherently carceral -a 'confinement without confinement' as Derrida later described psychoanalysis. 63 But one does not need to be mad, or to be a card-carrying Freudian, to know that madness is at bottom a self-incarceration. The therapeutic relationship that Foucault excoriates may not be as gentle or ethically unambiguous as the moral therapists imagined (or as transcendently illuminating as some psychoanalytic enthusiasts fondly believe), but the guilt and pain that it releases are the patient's own; what Foucault derides as the 'miracle cure' of the disclosed self has nothing miraculous about it.
64 'To know the worst about oneself ', the psychoanalyst Marion Milner once wrote, '[is] like the breaking down of a prison wall'.
65
The moral treatment phase of British asylum history was shortlived. In the second half of the nineteenth century, asylum populations rose rapidly, as pauper lunatics crowded in from the workhouses, and the wards 'silted up' with the 'chronically crazy'.
66 Moral therapy collapsed under the combined pressures of overcrowding, 'cheeseparing economies, overworked medical superintendents . . . untrained, undersupervised nursing staff'. 67 By the late 1860s, most asylums had reintroduced straitjacketing and other physical restraints.
68 By the end of the nineteenth century, the curative optimism of the asylum pioneers had vanished entirely, to be replaced by a hereditarian determinism as gloomy as the decaying buildings housing the 'degenerates' and 'defectives' that lunatics had now become. 69 Care collapsed into custodialism, as the mad were pronounced irredeemable, 'tainted persons', and the asylums became their prisons.
70
The fate of Colney Hatch asylum -my asylum, as I cannot help thinking of it -illustrates well this sad collapse of vision. Even before construction began on Colney Hatch, John Conolly was warning the Middlesex officials that the asylum's projected size of 1,000 inmates would militate against the 'close and intimate' care that lunatics required. Wards would be unvisited, patients neglected and 'many good principles . . . hopelessly given up'.
71 In 1849, the foundation stone was laid in a flurry of moral-treatment propaganda. No hand or foot would be bound at Colney Hatch, the chairman of the Middlesex magistrates declared at the ceremony, for here was no mere gaol but 'a curative institution, and . . . we anticipate that, with the advantages which this asylum can command, it will soon acquire a European reputation'.
72 The asylum opened in 1851, the year of the Great Exhibition. People coming to London for the Exhibition were urged to visit, to admire the asylum's lovely grounds and elaborate Italianate frontage, to peer down its endless corridors (the main corridor was a third of a mile, the longest in Europe) and to witness at first hand the happy condition of its inmates, labouring peaceably in the communal farms, gardens and craft workshops.
73 A decade later, such visitors could, if they wished, attend a 'lunatic ball' (fifteen of these were held in 1868 alone, along with magic lantern exhibitions, concerts, lectures and plays) or the ever-popular summer fête. So idyllic did all this seem that it left more than one early visitor convinced that Colney Hatch was a model environment for the sane as well as the insane. The only anxiety was that patients enjoying a steady diet of such delights would never want to leave.
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Yet almost as soon as Colney Hatch opened, the Lunacy Commission was expressing concern about overcrowding and insanitation, its dark prison-like wards and poor structural condition. By 1865, the asylum's population had doubled, mechanical restraints were in use, and the overall atmosphere, especially in the 'refractory wards', was so oppressive that the commissioners were moved to declare that '[i]t would be difficult to instance more perfect examples of what the wards of an asylum . . . should not be, than are presented here'.
75 The downward spiral continued relentlessly through the rest of the century and into the next, through two world wars and the foundation of the NHS. the medical staff of the asylum -now renamed Friern Mental Hospitalon an equal footing with doctors and nurses in general hospitals, but otherwise effected few changes. 76 The mid-1950s saw admissions into UK mental hospitals reach a new high, including admissions into Friern which were running at three times the pre-war rate. 77 The succeeding decade saw some improvements to the hospital, including the introduction of psychotherapeutic treatments;
78 but in 1966, Friern was hit by a major scandal when Barbara Robb, a campaigner for the elderly, revealed serious abuses in the care of the demented elderly there. Robb's report, and the publicity and government inquiry that followed, led to calls for closure, although no official action was taken until over a decade later.
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Not all mental hospitals were faring so badly. In the 1950s and 1960s, a wave of innovative energy swept throughout the asylum system, with the introduction of new treatments and rehabilitation programmes, the unlocking of wards and a revitalisation of moral therapy, especially among psychiatrists with a psychodynamic bent.
80 David Clark, the psychoanalytically trained medical superintendent of Fulbourne Mental Hospital, was a leader in this moral-treatment renaissance, introducing psychosocial therapies that soon became very influential under the banner of the 'therapeutic community' movement. 81 In his memoir of Fulbourne, Clark recalled the transition from custodialism to the therapeutic-community regimen: 'It was more satisfying to intelligent and sensitive staff and was more humane and dignified. However, it did require more staff and it was perplexing and exhausting work. To open oneself fully to the tortured feelings of the deeply mentally ill is very disturbing.' Similar developments were occurring in other UK mental hospitals, and the sector was gripped by a resurgent curative optimism.
83 It was at this point that the government, in the person of Enoch Powell, announced its intention to close the hospitals -a timing later described by Roy Porter as a 'rich irony': 'our age, which has seen the agitation for the closing of traditional asylums come to fruition, has also been the time when many of them have been, at long last, most therapeutically innovative and successful'.
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By the late 1970s, asylums everywhere were running down, with wards closing and their former inhabitants out on the street. By the mid-1980s, the hospital population had declined by two-thirds: a truly astonishing rate of reduction when one realises that it was achieved, as Peter Sedgwick wrote at the time, 'through the creation of a rhetoric of "community care facilities" whose influence over policy in hospital admission and discharge has been particularly remarkable when one considers that they do not, in the actual world, exist'. 85 Opposition MPs declared community care a 'catastrophe': a judgement later endorsed by a leading figure in UK mental health politics, Baroness Elaine Murphy, who titled her account of community care between 1962 and 1990, 'The Disaster Years'.
86
Friern's closure was announced in the midst of this debacle. In July 1983, the hospital learned its fate from a televised news announcement.
87
Staff were very shocked. Significant improvements had been made to the hospital in the wake of the Robb scandal, and doctors and nurses had no inkling of any closure plans.
88 In 1980, the Hospital Management Team had even issued a glossy brochure, Friern 2000, celebrating the hospital's achievements and looking forward to the next millennium.
89 But the North East Thames Regional Health Authority had done its feasibility studies and added up its sums, and Friern faced the axe. The decade that followed was a wretched one for the staff, some of whom mounted a robust anti-closure campaign but were soon outgunned by their opponents.
'We were quite a militant group', Doris Hollander, a consultant on my ward who led the campaign, later recalled: '[but] [t]here were other powerful organisations saying "It has got to happen now" . . . There was no shortage of people who could point to all the terrible things in the old hospitals and disregard their positive side.' 91 Hollander's views were aired in parliament, where in July 1990, the Labour MP for Islington North, Jeremy Corbyn, described a state of 'panic' among patients at Friern, and demanded assurance that the hospital's closure would not proceed unless adequate accommodation for its inmates could be guaranteed.
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A few of these patients and former patients made their voices heard, attending meetings with Friern managers where they expressed support for the hospital's closure mixed, however, with strong concern about postclosure provision. 93 Even the local vicar got in on the act, collecting fifty signatures on an anti-closure petition. 94 Meanwhile, in 1985, a team of researchers moved into Friern, under the aegis of a government-funded study into the impact of the hospital's closure on its former residents. The Team for the Assessment of Psychiatric Services (TAPS) researchers followed the progress of inmates into staffed group homes over a five-year period and reported, for the most part positively, on their lives there. 95 The people being studied, however, had been selected for their capability while many others, more disabled and harder to place, remained in hospital; some were still there on the night before Friern closed.
96 Moreover -and more important for the long-term consequences of the hospital's closure -over a third of the decanted patients required readmission during the five-year follow-up.
97
Alternative inpatient provision was radically insufficient, and seriously ill patients entering the hospital in its twilight days faced an accelerating crisis of resources. Many of these 'new long-stay' patients, as they were awkwardly dubbed, did not qualify for the new community facilities: what was to become of them, when Friern's doors closed for the last time?
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In 1989, I was a likely candidate for 'new long stay' status, or at least that was certainly how I saw myself when I entered Friern for the third time and remained there for over six months. My stints in Friern came midway through the closure process, and the evidence of this was everywhere. Most of the ward nurses had left and been replaced by agency staff.
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The ward across the stairwell from mine was empty, having been burned out in a major fire shortly before I arrived. Corridors were sealed off, therapy rooms locked up, the old apple orchard was choked with weeds. The kiln in the pottery workroom broke down and was not repaired; a little pot that I left in the firing queue was thrown away.
Yet for me Friern was truly an asylum. I entered it on my knees: I could no longer do ordinary life, and giving up the struggle was an incalculable relief. My home in the hospital was a locked acute ward with a deservedly violent reputation: a Dickensian barrack of crumbled brickwork and peeling walls, reeking with fag smoke and teeming with ghosts; but for me it was a sanctuary. I settled in quickly, got to know people, acquired a lot of new survival skills (some of which have proven surprisingly useful since, especially in university committees). I was very wretched most of the time, and often frightened, but I felt safe from what I feared the most: myself. This was a huge plus, and I wanted to stay forever.
People like me who end up in the bin -that is, educated, middle-class people -if they write about the experience later on, often sound a bit like tourists on an alien planet. But I was no tourist. By the end of the 1980s, I was deeply embedded in the world of the chronically mentally ill. I had lost my home, and was living in a psychiatric hostel. When I was not in Friern, I was at the Whittington day hospital (later made notorious by Clare Allen in her bestselling novel Poppy Shakespeare) or at the Pine Street Day Centre in Finsbury. I still had friends and connections from earlier days, but I spent most of my time with other mental health users with whom I often felt more comfortable than with old chums (although I should add here that old chums were wonderfully kind and supportive). It wasn't a good life, but it was a do-able life: and in its best moments it yielded feelings of care and belonging which were new to me. 'I think it will be good for you to stay here for a while', my Friern psychiatrist told me in the summer of 1989, 'you will discover that you can be looked after, and that will be important to you.' She was right on both counts.
Mental hospitals like Friern were places of horror for many. Recorded testimony from former Friern inmates speaks of coercion and neglect: of nurses punishing awkward patients with violent drug injections; of beatings; of psychiatrists ignoring or deriding patients.
100 I witnessed abuses like these, especially of 'sectioned' patients (those legally detained under the terms of the 1983 Mental Health Act). My voluntary status and, even more, my middle classness protected me from the worst of such cruelties, although I too was briefly targeted by a sadistic nurse who made my life hell for a time. No one who has ever been subjected to such behaviours is likely to wax nostalgic about the asylum system, or to mourn its demise -and I do not.
And yet: I also received a lot of very effective looking-after during my years as a mental patient. Living in the bin was tough, but it gave me some shelter from my darkest self and, very importantly, the friendship of other patients, which made my days tolerable. My psychiatrist, who was psychoanalytically oriented, was intelligent and kind. During the three plus years I was under her care, I was also seeing a psychoanalyst five times a week. Like many severely ill people in psychoanalysis, I became abjectly dependent on my analyst. This dependence, and the painful therapeutic dialogues to which it gave rise, were the means by which I learned the sources of my misery, and gradually made my peace with them.
In 1990, this therapeutic education went through a crisis which proved to be a turning-point. The following year, I left my last day centre, and in 1992, I was discharged from the UK mental health system.
Friern closed in April 1993. Two years later it reopened as Princess Park Manor, 'a supremely elegant' residence of some 200 apartments. The gorgeous asylum frontage and part of the grounds were retained, but otherwise all traces of the old asylum were obliterated -bar the original commemorative plaque, which now overlooks the glossy reception area outside the Manor's gym.
In 1996, a group of film-makers came to Princess Park Manor to interview the first batch of apartment owners.
101 They brought with them a few former patients, including one whom I knew slightly -a bright, pugnacious Mind activist. The film that resulted is riveting. As the two groups of inhabitants chatter to camera, a slow movement toward each other occurs. The patients are thoughtful, humorous, fluent. One, a former theatre-worker, describes the hospital as having been 'hell on earth'. Finding himself in the gutted main hall, he abruptly opens his mouth and sings his heart out. 'I can go now', he tells the camera. 'I'm not frightened any more.' Another, an elderly man, looks wistfully at the carcase of his ward, my 'second home', and reminisces about his time on the Friern football team. Meanwhile, a feng shui consultant is busy tapping for energy sources in the walls. 'Phew!' she cries, knocking hard, 'Something sure was going on here!' Are they afraid of ghosts? the film-makers ask the new residents. None will admit to this, but all emphasise their sympathy for the mentally ill. 'My friends say I should have been in an institution like this long ago', one man chortles. Quizzed about their reasons for choosing the Manor, some become remarkably self-revealing, one retired man describing the 'mad' world beyond its gates as too stressful for him, while a divorcée admits that she hopes such a self-contained housing development -with its fancy leisure facilities, café and private bus service to the train station and shops -will bring her new friends and romances. She had been feeling pretty suicidal before she moved in, she confides. How ironic, my Mind acquaintance comments to the camera, that people are now willing to pay large sums of money to live in a place that advertises itself as somewhere that you 'never need to leave'. With its manned security gate, high tech locking systems and omnipresent surveillance cameras, Princess Park Manor aims to keep out what Friern was meant to keep in: but not all the devils that beset individuals are so easily contained. Yet it is good to be reminded, as this lovely film does, of the miseries and frailties common to all humankind, whether hopefully mad or hopelessly sane.
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I was fortunate not to need an asylum by the time Friern closed. I would not like to have been left to the tender mercies of 'the community'. Reading mental health policy documents today -with their warm talk of 'connected communities' and 'shared visions' 103 -it would be easy to imagine that the up-close therapeutic regimen pioneered by Pinel and the Tukes, and revived by the therapeutic-community movement in the 1950s, was once again in the ascendant. In fact, nothing could be further from the truth. In the quick-fix, drug-based culture of present-day psychiatry, the community, in Peter Barham words, 'possesses null value':
104 it is not a site of belonging and support; it is just where people go when they are sufficiently 'recovered' to negotiate daily life without posing a 103 Mental Health Division Department of Health, New Horizons (see n. 25). 104 Barham, Closing the Asylum, 13.
danger to themselves or others. The notion that decanting people from institutions automatically improves their lives is a convenient myth. 'There is an assumption', the TAPS researchers wrote in the run-up to Friern's closure, 'that the quality of life for those who are relatively independent in the community is by definition greater than the quality of life for those . . . in asylum-type settings. This assumption is not easily supported.'
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In the UK today, community mental health services are delivered to their recipients as 'care packages'. Care is individuated and disconnected from any communal body; the enforced sociality of the asylum has been replaced by the insularity of the healthcare consumer. Sociability among service users is not encouraged: day centres of the kind that I attended, and where I made some very close friends, are now mostly closed.
106 Service users are meant to integrate into the community, which for people with serious mental disorders can be a cruelly daunting ambition. The muchtouted independence of the community-based user thus often equals a life of lonely isolation, with a television for companionship.
107 It is an extraordinary fact that -in a modern world acknowledged by all to be fragmented, anomic, and psychologically demanding of even the most capable -mentally ill people are increasingly expected to thrive (to achieve 'wellness' in another buzzword) with a minimum of day-to-day support. Most people in twenty-first century Britain spend most of their lives in institutions of one sort or another -schools, offices, factories, universities -and few of us could manage emotionally without the sense of belonging that these institutions provide. The old mental hospitals had plenty wrong with them -horribly wrong, in many cases -but they nurtured communities of their own whose disappearance has been painful for many. People, with or without mental disorders, depend on other people to lead a decent life: we do not really need history to tell us this, but history can show what happens when we forget it. The asylum story is not a good one, but if the demise of the asylum means the death of effective and humane mental health care, then this will be more than a bad ending to the story: it will be a tragedy.
